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Abstract
Economic welfare rests on entrepreneurs, competition, and good governance. All three have 
a positive effect if embedded in a set of good institutions. Major question here is: how do we 
get good institutions? The paper concentrates on the example of governance. Good institutions 
and good governance are not solely the result of discrete policy decisions; as far as beliefs and 
informal rules are concerned, they are also the result of an evolutionary process of longue durée. 
The core of the paper is a discussion of evolutionary institutional change. Three theoretical 
approaches are discussed: the Marx-Schumpeter approach and its neoclassical offsprings, 
a further extension by the Stanford economists Aoki and Greif, and Hayek’s ‘spontaneous’ 
evolution. Change at the institutional frontier and imitation or catching up to the institutional 
frontier seem to be different processes. Why countries fail to catch up constitutes a challenging 
puzzle, for incumbent institutions show a remarkable persistence. Findings are illustrated by 
developments in post-socialist transformation.
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1 Introduction
According to the Marx-Schumpeter theory of development, the dynamics of a capitalist 
economic system depends on entrepreneurship which develops in a market context and 
is stimulated by competition in the market. At the same time, more recent research 
has suggested that the functioning of the market, and the entrepreneurial activity 
accompanying it, depends on the actions of the state, in particular good governance. As a 
corollary, economic welfare rests on entrepreneurs, competition, and good governance. 
 An entrepreneur is either leaving the trodden paths of equilibrium and exploring 
new combinations,1 or he is trying to benefi t from arbitrage opportunities of existing 
disequilibria.2 Whilst the former destroys the equilibrium, the latter restores it. The 
former type can be compared to an adventurer, the latter more to a speculator. It is largely 
the adventurer who is referred to when one speaks of an entrepreneur. Entrepreneurship 
is an individual property of which we know little. It would appear innate; it is simply 
there. It is exogenous to economic theory. 
 Whether the individual property of entrepreneurship will develop, and in which 
direction, depends on its environment, in particular on the institutional structure of 
the society in which the individual is living. This is because institutions determine the 
pay-off of individual activity, and entrepreneurs, like anyone else, are striving for the 
highest pay-off. Take, for instance, the Soviet economic system, which did not allow for 
private enterprise. Entrepreneurial capacity had to move into the shadow of economy 
or deploy its energy within the ranks of the party. Even more important for economic 
welfare is the choice between productive and redistributive activity. If the rewards 
of rent-seeking, piracy, or corruption are expected to be higher than the profi ts from 
productive enterprise, it will be rent-seeking, piracy, or corruption that attracts most of 
the entrepreneurial talent. 
* Dr. Hans-Jürgen Wagener is Professor emeritus of Europa-Universität Viadrina at Frankfurt (Oder) 
and Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. The author is obliged to several commentators and referees for valuable 
criticism.
1 J. A. Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development (1911/1934).
2 I. M. Kirzner, Competition and Entrepreneurship (1973).
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 It has become common to defi ne institutions ‘as the constraints that human beings 
impose on themselves’.3 Such constraints can be formal in nature, such as rules of 
the game and laws, or they can be informal, such as customs, traditions, and codes of 
conduct. The effectiveness of constraints depends not only on the respective norm, but 
equally on the mechanism of its enforcement. Despite their evident relevance, informal 
constraints are poorly understood, especially their enforcement mechanisms.4 The state, 
with its monopoly of legal use of force, is the primary organisation that can enforce 
formal constraints effectively. However, the state is inconsistent; it may produce either 
good or bad governance. It may provide for a productive environment channelling 
entrepreneurial activity into welfare enhancing enterprise. If not properly kept in check 
by a constitution, the media, or the citizenry, the state can also be used as an instrument 
for redistributive activities. 
 The major question here is: how do we ensure good institutions? Little insight is 
needed to notice the huge gap between highly productive developed societies and less 
developed countries with a low level of welfare. Although there have always been 
differences between richer and poorer countries, this huge gap only appeared around 
250 years ago (i.e. it is the consequence of modern economic growth).5 A sanguine 
interpretation of this fact may point to the rather brief history of modern economic 
growth, for reason of which it would appear to be natural that some regions developed 
the factors conducive to economic growth, whilst others lagged behind, adapting slow to 
the new conditions. In terms of Schumpeter’s dynamics, some enterprising nations have 
found new combinations and thereby broken up the old equilibrium. A new equilibrium 
will be restored by imitation and adaptation. The recent surge of catching-up by China, 
India and Brazil may be seen as confi rmation of this view. However, if good institutions 
are part of the new combinations, a major question remains: why did it take 250 years 
to turn the trend? What can a less developed society do in order to embark on the path 
of welfare growth? And, if we know what will promote welfare growth, why can it not 
be implemented immediately?
 The obvious answer to this question would be that good institutions and good 
governance are not solely the result of discrete policy decisions; as far as beliefs and 
informal rules are concerned, they are the result of an evolutionary process of longue 
durée. This paper attempts to justify such an answer. Of course, we cannot address the 
whole range of beliefs and institutions, but will concentrate on good governance as an 
example of political activity based on a certain set of good institutions. We will then 
look at theories of institutional change that are more elaborate with respect to formal 
rules. There are two types of theories, decision-based and evolutionary, which are both 
still rather tentative. The longue durée of evolution and the tenacity of informal rules 
does not signify that policy is powerless, but rather, that one has to be patient.
2 Good Governance 
For the sake of clarity, we have chosen governance as an example of a set of institutions 
with a distinct impact upon economic welfare. Although this term may be new, the 
concept has been known for a long time. Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-Lobatón defi ne 
governance as ‘the traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is 
exercised. This includes (1) the process by which governments are selected, monitored 
and replaced, (2) the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement 
sound policies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them’.6 To test the relevance of governance, it 
has to be measured. It is a major achievement of a World Bank team working with 
Daniel Kaufmann to have produced a set of six aggregate governance indicators that 
3 D. C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (1990), at 5.
4 E. Schlicht, ‘On custom’, 149 Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 1 (1993).
5 Hans-Jürgen Wagener, ‘Why Europe? On Comparative Long-term Growth’, 6 The European Journal 
of Comparative Economics 2, at 287-323 (2009).
6 D. Kaufmann, A. Kraay, P. Zoido-Lobatón ‘Governance Matters’, World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper 2196, (1999).
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have been calculated for, to date, 213 countries of the world over the period 1996-
2009.7 The method is complicated and is not signifi cant in the context of this paper.8 
Suffi ce it to say that the indicators combine statutory rules on the books (i.e. formal 
institutions) with their implementation on the ground which is heavily infl uenced by 
informal institutions or traditions as the authors have called them. 
 The six dimensions of governance are:
 - voice and accountability
 - political stability and absence of violence
 - government effectiveness
 - regulatory quality
 - rule of law
 - control of corruption.
The institutional quality is clarifi ed when it is exemplifi ed in the antithesis between 
good governance and bad governance. This combines formal and informal institutions, 
policies, and actual conduct:
Good governance Bad governance
Voice and accountability Political instability and violence
Participation unconstitutional conduct
democratic rights interference of the military
freedom of press political terrorism
government effectiveness regulatory burden
transparent administration incompetent personnel
credibility market unfriendly policies
ability to compromise Ineffective judicial control
rule of law Graft
enforceability of contracts Corruption
predictability of courts state capture
respect of the institutions rent seeking
Briefl y summarised, good government is democratically legitimised, effective, and 
credible, whereas bad government is unpredictable, costly, and corrupt. Such attributes 
are created not only by formal institutions and their implementation, but also, to a 
considerable extent, by informal institutions, attitudes, and culture. Good governance 
implies good order, good policies, and the readiness of state offi cials and citizenry alike 
to honour the rules, traditions, and values. ‘Good’ can mean two different things in this 
context. Good order and good policies are state of the art as far as social science is able 
to defi ne them. They can also be described procedurally, implying universal in contrast 
to particular measures, with impartiality as principal norm.9
 The direct effect of good governance is a certain congruence between political 
intentions and their implementation, in the same manner as good management in a 
company enhances the commitment and productivity of the employees. This in itself 
does not guarantee welfare, since political intentions can be badly conceived as a result 
of, for instance, lack of knowledge and information. However, we know of no state that 
constitutionally supports corruption, whilst we know of many states where corruption 
7 <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp>.
8 But see D. Kaufmann and A. Kraay, ‘Governance Indicators: Where Are We, Where Should We Be 
Going?’, 23 The World Bank Research Observer 1, at 1-30 (2008). Pertinent criticism can be found in 
S. Voigt, How (Not) to Measure Institutions, Paper Prepared for World Bank Workshop on Governance 
Indicators, Washington, DC, June 2008, available at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1336272>.
9 Such is the defi nition of B. Rothstein, The Quality of Government. Corruption, Social Trust and 
Inequality in International Perspective Chicago (2011), at Chapter 1.
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is nevertheless highly prevalent. The indirect effect is a feed-back either from welfare, 
or from the experience of loyalty and constancy of rules, upon preferences, values, 
and beliefs of the actors. This infl uences their strategies and policies by which they 
determine not only their actual behaviour, but also choices concerning constitutional 
order and economic policy proper.10
 The aforementioned feed-back effect demonstrates the diffi culty in ascertaining 
an unambiguous causal link between good governance, or institutions in general, and 
economic welfare.11 Since good governance develops, as will be seen, over a rather long 
period of time, we can only establish a kind of co-evolution for both good governance 
and welfare. Its result, however, is strikingly clear. The World Bank team gives a 
ranking (from 0 to 100) for the six governance dimensions. In the following table we 
have aggregated them by a simple arithmetic average. As illustration we compare the 
results from the 13 highest-ranking countries (very small countries omitted) and 13 
lowest-ranking countries and their GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity).12
Table 1: Average Ranking of Governance Quality and GDP per capita
Country Average 
ranking GI
GDP per capita 
in 1990 intern. $
Country Average 
ranking GI
GDP per capita 
in 1990 intern. $
2009 2008 2009 2008
Austria 93.2 24 100 Afghanistan 3.0 900
Australia 92.5 25 300 Burma 2.2 3 100
Canada 94.5 25 300 Chad 6.3 700
Denmark 97.0 24 600 Haiti 15.7 700
Finland 98.0 24 300 Iran 14.5 6 900
Germany 90.2 20 800 Iraq 7.5 1 000
Netherlands 94.5 24 700 North Korea 7.7 1 100
New Zealand 96.3 18 600 Somalia 0.3 1 000
Norway 95.7 28 500 Sudan 5.7 1 500
Sweden 97.0 24 400 Uzbekistan 11.7 5 300
Switzerland 96.2 25 100 Venezuela 12.0 10 600
UK 86.2 23 700 Zaire 3.8 250
USA 83.5 31 200 Zimbabwe 3.8 800
Sources: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/wgidataset.xls;
  http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/Historical_Statistics/horizontal-fi le_02-2010.xls; and
  own calculations.
The table needs little explanation.13 It has to be kept in mind that the statistics are mean 
values of estimates with certain standard deviations. At 250 international Dollars of 
1990 per annum, the population of Zaire could hardly survive. This fi gure indicates an 
absolute welfare minimum. Bad governance can be compensated to a certain degree 
by a richness in natural resources, as the cases of Venezuela and Iran would suggest. 
The other countries on the right side of the table encompass stories of political turmoil, 
10 Again, we may refer to Rothstein who shows that generalised social trust presupposes the experience 
of impartial activity of the administration. This seems obvious, for if we expect the administration to be 
corrupt and corruption to be the general rule, we cannot trust other people to treat us fairly. See B. Rothstein, 
Social Traps and the Problem of Trust (2005), at 109.
11 M. Paldam and E. Gundlach, ‘Two Views on Institutions and Development: The Grand Transition v. the 
Primacy of Institutions’, 61 Kyklos 1 (2008). 
12 For the method see A. Maddison, The World Economy. A Millennial Perspective (2001) and A. Maddison, 
The World Economy: Historical Statistics (2003).
13 Although one should not dismiss too lightly the criticism that the governance indicators, being mostly 
based on subjective evaluations, will probably not be independent of the level of development. See Voigt, 
above n. 8.
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dictatorship, and economic incompetence. In contrast, the high convergence of well-
governed countries on the other side indicates that such nations operate at the welfare 
and governance frontier.
 The table might evoke the idea of two equilibria: good governance and bad 
governance. However, this would be erroneous. If anything, we are confronted with a 
multi-equilibria situation. Between the two extremes shown in the table there is a more 
or less equally distributed continuum of the remaining 187 countries covered by the 
World Bank team. There are gradations of bad governance and the ranking of individual 
countries may vary over the (admittedly extremely short) period of observation, but 
with few exceptions, the relative position of the countries hardly changes. The following 
fi gure illustrates the two-equilibria and the multi-equilibria situation, with the troughs 
representing stable equilibria and the peaks representing unstable equilibria. The multi-
equilibria situation can be considered more hopeful, since the distance and height of the 
rim between two adjacent cases are less diffi cult to overcome. 
Figure 1: Multiple Equilibria of Governance and Welfare
An autocratic or cleptocratic governing elite may benefi t from the situation even under 
very poor conditions, and try to perpetuate it by force. Generally, it can be assumed 
that both the governing elite and the population see the advantage offered by good 
governance. This assumption gives rise to the question: how was it possible that we do 
not have good governance and what is to be done to get it? This brings us to the problem 
of the emergence of institutions and institutional change.
3 Institutional Change and Evolution
Since Menger,14 two paths have been identifi ed through which social and economic 
institutions are developed:
 - the pragmatic
 - the organic.
Pragmatically constructed institutions are always the result of deliberate decisions 
or some kind of rational choice. Many institutions, in particular informal ones, are 
not derived from pragmatic construction but are unintended results of historical 
development. Menger was vague concerning the cause of pragmatic changes and how 
organic changes were brought about. He went to great lengths, however, to show that 
any analogy of natural phenomena and social phenomena, in particular organic ones, 
14 C. Menger, Untersuchungen über die Methode der Socialwissenschaften und der Politischen Ökonomie 
insbesondere (1883).
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is understandable, but quite misleading.15 Firstly, pragmatic institutions cannot be 
explained by an organic analogy; if anything, they would be explained by a mechanistic 
analogy. Secondly, analogy is only an unspecifi ed feeling of similarity. And thirdly, the 
origin of institutions follows its own rules which are the rules of collective decision-
making in the case of the pragmatic, and are ‘the unrefl ected result of human activities 
that are aimed at basically individual intentions (i.e. the unintended outcome of the 
latter)’16 in the case of the ‘organic’. The origins of social phenomena and natural 
organisms are essentially different, with the distinction lying in the intentionality of the 
former. 
 Menger’s examples of ‘organic’ institutions encompass the law in general, language, 
the state, money, and markets, all of which evolved in a distant past and are now well-
entrenched. It is certainly true that money, for instance, is the product of historical 
development. Today’s supply and regulation of money, however, is clearly a pragmatic 
process. The processes that govern the historical origin of social institutions need not be 
the processes that govern contemporary institutional change. What we need, therefore, 
is some more theory of both.
 It is worth noting that Menger, although well acquainted with Darwin, carefully 
avoids the term ‘evolutionary’ and lists Herbert Spencer, the fi rst social Darwinist, as 
among those who erroneously stress the naturalistic analogy. Indeed, since according to 
Darwin, purpose, planning, teleology and intentionality have no place in the evolution of 
species, economic evolution, as seen by mainstream economics, has nothing in common 
with Darwin. As Douglass North recently put it: ‘In contrast to Darwinian evolutionary 
theory, the key to human evolutionary change is the intentionality of the players’.17 This 
begs the question of what economic evolution or human evolutionary change really 
means. 
 Evolutionary economics, along with other forms of evolutionary social science, is 
a topical issue. Witt has shown that people can mean different things when using the 
term.18 Evolution of nature, society, or the human mind consists of change resulting 
in the creation of new capacities and their dissemination.19 From this it follows that 
pragmatic as well as organic institutional change can be termed evolutionary. What 
triggers the development process, who or what creates novelty, and by which processes 
or mechanisms new combinations are spread, may be specifi c to the fi eld where evolution 
is observed. Menger and North, for instance, emphasise that the evolution of social 
institutions is always the result of deliberate human activity, which in natural evolution 
of the Darwinian type is clearly not the case. Intentionality of the players, however, only 
constitutes a distinctive feature if individuals possess a free will and act in a controlled 
way. This is an age-old philosophical question and presently a much-discussed topic 
amongst neuroscientists. 
 The development of the mind is governed by natural evolution. Yet it is hard to 
tell where, in this process, the dividing line between nature and civilisation should be 
drawn. Firstly, if the environment shapes the mind, natural and social phenomena will 
be of equal importance. Secondly, the infant industry of neuroeconomics has already 
shown us that alongside controlled processes, many activities are driven by automatic 
processes which do not follow from a preference – constraints calculus: ‘As economists, 
we are used to thinking of preferences as the starting point for human behaviour and 
behaviour as the ending point. A neuroscience perspective, in contrast, views explicit 
behaviour as only one of many mechanisms that the brain uses to maintain homeostasis, 
and preferences as transient state variables that ensure survival and reproduction’.20 
15 Id., at 142-146.
16 Id., at 145. Therefore the denomination organic is somewhat unfortunate. Hayek, although following 
Menger quite closely, avoids it. 
17 D.C. North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change (2005), at Chapter 8.
18 U. Witt ,‘What is specifi c about evolutionary economics?’, 18 Journal of Evolutionary Economics 5, at 
547-75 (2008).
19 Id., at 552.
20 C. Camerer, G. Loewenstein and D. Prelec,‘Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience Can Inform 
Economics’, 43 Journal of Economic Literature 1, at 27 (2005). 
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Although this does not deny the relevance of intentionality, it serves as a warning not to 
overemphasise it.
4 The Marx-Schumpeter Approach
In recent years, a number of attempts have been made to explain institutional change.21 
Economists, trained in rational choice models, concentrated upon the pragmatic case. 
Only after realising the importance of informal institutions, in particular of value and 
belief systems that evidently cannot be changed by deliberate decision-making, the 
‘organic’ case attracted some attention. In an ideal neoclassical world, which equates to 
perfect and costless information and no transaction costs, institutions do not matter for 
the purposes of allocative effi ciency. However, this state has nothing in common with 
economic reality, characterised by uncertainty and positive information and transaction 
costs. It was Ronald Coase who fi rst took account of this state of affairs.22 This was also 
the beginning of modern institutional economics.
 Amongst the fi rst economists to deal with institutional change was Karl Marx in 
his vision (it can hardly be called a theory) of historical materialism.23 This is based 
on exogenous changes of knowledge and consequently production techniques. Such 
changes open up new profi t opportunities which are, however, in confl ict with existing 
property relations. These have to be changed to benefi t from the new opportunities. 
With the change in property relations, the whole system of legal, political, and social 
relations, as well as, fi nally, the belief systems, will also change. Under capitalism, the 
motive force, innovation, will be endogenised by competition among the capitalists. The 
Marxian approach was tainted by Marx’s teleological belief in progress adopted from 
Hegel. Progress in evolution means that there is a determinate target of the development 
process which, as we have seen, has been denied by Darwin for evolutionary biology.
 With methodological individualism, derived from Menger (who called it atomism), 
Schumpeter makes clear that it must be individual decisions that propel development 
and his entrepreneur is the fi gure who opens the way for new combinations.24 Considered 
one of the founding fathers of evolutionary economics,25 Schumpeter avoided the term 
‘evolution’ in the same manner, and for probably the same reasons, as Menger. Like 
Marx, he gives little attention to the creation of novelty, the process of invention. 
Schumpeter considers innovation, the activity of the entrepreneur, as most relevant in 
testing the viability of new combinations, since only innovation affects the economic 
equilibrium. 
 Thus, institutional change is part and parcel of the Marx-Schumpeter theory of 
economic development. This theory has found a number of reformulations and extensions 
quite closely connected to neoclassical microeconomics, a recent and infl uential one 
in North.26 Change derives from the continuous interaction between institutions and 
organisations. It would appear to be in confl ict with methodological individualism, but 
this is not actually the case, since organisations are represented by entrepreneurs who 
are the actual players. Like Marx and Schumpeter, North holds the opinion that ‘changes 
in [the] stock of knowledge is the key to the evolution of economies’.27 Competition 
stimulates the search for profi table new combinations through which institutions can be 
changed. According to North, the perception of feasible alternatives is governed by the 
belief system of the players, which acts as a fi lter to the information from experience. 
21 For an overview see C. Kingston and G. Caballero, ‘Comparing Theories of Institutional Change’ 
5 Journal of Institutional Economics 2 (2009). The earlier D. Kiwit and S. Voigt, ‘Überlegungen zum 
institutionellen Wandel unter Berücksichtigung des Verhältnisses interner und externer Institutionen’, 46 
Ordo. Jahrbuch für die Ordnung von Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft (1995), is still worth reading.
22 In his seminal article of 1937 ‘The Nature of the Firm’, see R. H. Coase, The Firm, the Market, and the 
Law (1988).
23 K. Marx, Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie (1859/1974).
24 J.A. Schumpeter, Das Wesen und der Hauptinhalt der theoretischen Nationalökonomie (1908/1970).
25 H. Hanusch (ed.), Evolutionary Economics. Applications of Schumpeter’s Ideas (1988).
26 North (2005), above n. 17, at 59. 
27 Id., at 63.
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In revolutionary Marx, it was the dominant group of players, the ruling class, who 
determine the direction of institutional change. North appears to agree: ‘the structure 
of an economic market refl ects the beliefs of those in a position to make the rules of 
the game’.28 However, his political and economic entrepreneurs, rather than forming 
a class, have widely diverse objectives and compete with one another. Change is the 
result of their bargaining process. The fi nal outcome should not be so different from 
Marx’s. This is because the group of entrepreneurs, as system managers, will see to it 
that the institutional body of society will not harm their interests. Only if competition 
yields unintended results will the outcome be less predictable. The mental construct of 
the belief system is exogenous in the short and medium term. In the very long term it 
is subject to endogenous change. The continuous search process makes normal change 
incremental. Discrete system transformations are the exception. Fixed mental constructs 
and institutional inertia make change path-dependent. 
 The Marx-Schumpeter theory, as well as some neoclassical further developments, 
such as those outlined by Demsetz,29 are basically optimistic. Systems with successful 
players introduce not only more productive technologies but also effi cient institutions. 
Thus, their welfare rises and less successful players will imitate or join them. If a change 
in the environment or in knowledge makes the incumbent institutional order obsolete 
(i.e. negative externalities arise), the search for a new order begins which ultimately 
will internalise the externalities. The paradigmatic case for this type of change is 
the introduction of private property. With North, optimism is somewhat attenuated, 
since not all profi table alternatives productively increase total welfare (they can also 
redistribute total welfare). Lin calls the former induced changes, since they follow 
from some changes in productive possibilities, and the latter imposed changes, since 
they result from a reshuffl ing of economic power.30 Induced changes lead to a good 
equilibrium, imposed ones do not necessarily do so. Predatory power elites and fi xed 
mental constructs may block progress.
 Let us briefl y summarise the paradigmatic case of the emergence of private property.31 
Neoclassical theory of institutional change has been succinctly formulated by Harold 
Demsetz: ‘Property rights develop to internalize externalities where the gains of 
internalization become larger than the cost of internalization. Increased internalization, 
in the main, results from changes in economic values, changes which stem from the 
development of new technology and the opening of new markets’.32
 Development of new technology and the opening of new markets are the 
achievements of Schumpeterian entrepreneurs (i.e. we are within the confi nes of the 
Marx-Schumpeter theory of institutional change). The driving force is the attempt of 
a community to maximise net wealth. This may require exclusive property rights. The 
costs of internalisation are exclusion costs and costs of internal governance. ‘Internal 
governance costs are likely to fall when a population becomes more homogeneous and 
adopts a common ideology.33 Here, informal norms and customs enter onto the stage. 
For what makes a population more homogeneous? Not so much common genes, but 
rather common tradition, language, and ideology. All three rest on common informal 
norms. 
 As long as Soviet-type economies were thriving, it was thought that exclusive 
property rights could be implemented by two more or less equivalent equilibria – 
private or communal property rights – the choice being determined by the presence 
of either more individualistic or more collectivist preferences. Communal property 
rights could be seen as less effi cient by either not fully internalising the externalities 
when exclusive rights are shared or causing higher costs of internalisation. In reality, 
this was exactly what happened. The breakdown of the socialist economic system and 
28 Id., at 50.
29 H. Demsetz,‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights’, 57 American Economic Review 2 (1967).
30 J.Y. Lin, ‘An Economic Theory of Institutional Change: Induced and Imposed Change’, 9 Cato Journal 
1 (1989).
31 See, for instance, H.J. Wagener, Zur Analyse von Wirtschaftssystemen. Eine Einführung (1979), at 173-
81 and T. Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions (1990), at 247-77.
32 Demsetz, above n. 29, at 350.
33 Eggertsson, above n. 31, at 258.
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the transformation from plan to market (i.e. from communal to private property rights) 
exemplify the discrete institutional change by which a more effi cient regime replaces a 
less effi cient one. The change was triggered by liberalisation of the admissible property 
rights regimes or a shift in ideology and preferences which ultimately equate to a shift 
in power relations. 
 Preferences, or the belief system in general, can block effi cient solutions. Such 
a situation can also be the result of powerful interests. Whilst the naïve neoclassical 
model is perfectly competitive (i.e. disregarding power), more sophisticated approaches, 
for instance, that of Libecap,34 take account of the probable winners and losers of 
institutional change and their infl uence in the political arena. We do not need to rely 
on preferences in order to explain communal property rights. There may be specifi c 
structures of exclusion costs and internal governance costs for reason of which rational 
individuals prefer communal to private or unspecifi ed property rights. As long as any 
arrangement is admissible, and there is competition between property rights regimes, 
the rich empirics of commons proves to be potentially effi cient. In order for this to 
occur, very specifi c rules have to be institutionalised, since a common pool is known to 
have an effi ciency problem or a prisoners’ dilemma right from the start. How these rules 
are designed, agreed upon, controlled, and eventually changed is an intricate question 
that can better be answered by case studies than by general theory.35 
5 The Stanford Extension
Institutions are helpful in creating equilibria of coordination processes since they 
economise on information and dovetail expectations. It is therefore little wonder that 
institutional economics has tried to tap game theoretic equilibrium analysis for further 
insights. This has been done by, amongst others, two Stanford scholars, Masahiko 
Aoki and Avner Greif, in what they call the institution-as-an-equilibrium approach.36 
In order to understand their explanation of institutional change I will briefl y summarise 
this approach, which can be considered to be an extension of the Marx-Schumpeter 
theory. For although there is mention of tacit belief systems, institutions are said to be 
humanly devised, exogenous changes play an important role in triggering change, and 
so do institutional entrepreneurs who test new combinations and attempt to get such 
combinations accepted.
 An institution is seen as a self-sustaining system of shared beliefs that individuals 
have about the rules of a repeated game. The (Nash-)equilibrium of a game has the nice 
property that the expectations of all players are fullfi lled and therefore nobody has the 
desire to change the situation. It is self-sustaining. There may, of course, be players 
who can imagine more agreeable situations. But given the parameters of the game, 
among which are to be found the role of each player and his respective power, such 
situations are not feasible. In a market, for instance, some players would prefer to have 
a monopoly position instead of being competitors. But as long as there is competition, 
their best strategy is to be a price taker and to adapt the quantities offered. By this 
behaviour competition is reinforced.
 Game theory demands that individual players have a high degree of knowledge about 
the strategic options and probable outcomes of all players. That is where institutions 
enter onto the stage. The beliefs of individuals, which institutions coordinate, constitute 
summary representation or compressed information about the equilibrium of a game: 
‘Agents’ strategic choices made on the basis of shared beliefs jointly reproduce the 
equilibrium state, which in turn reconfi rms its summary representation. Thus the 
institution becomes self-sustaining and information compressed in it becomes taken 
for granted by the agents. … In this way, although endogenously created, an institution 
becomes objectifi ed’.37 
34 G.D. Libecap, Contracting for Property Rights (1989).
35 E. Ostrom, Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (1990).
36 M. Aoki, Toward a Comparative Institutional Analysis (2001); A. Greif, Institutions and the Path to the 
Modern Economy. Lessons from Medieval Trade (2006).
37 Aoki, above n. 36, at 12.
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 The example of the price system provides a useful illustration. The rules of the 
market (free entrance and exit, freedom of trade, competition) allow to aggregate each 
individual’s private information into the system of relative prices. Taking prices as 
given, individuals make their own decisions. If the price system is not in equilibrium, 
excess demand and supply will push it toward equilibrium. If all private information is 
taken account of, equilibrium is reached and individual decisions will be optimal. Each 
individual follows the rules and takes the market price as given, thus confi rming the 
order. However, life is not as simple as that. As soon as strategic behaviour shows up in 
the context of imperfect competition, multiple equilibria are possible. In the long run, 
however, only robust and stable strategies will survive and will be used by all.38 Thus, 
there must be convergence of beliefs regarding the rules of the game.
 The summary representation of an equilibrium may be symbolic or tacit, which 
comes close to formal and informal institutions. Examples of symbolic representations 
are statutory laws, agreements, and structural arrangements or organisations that defi ne 
and distribute differentiated roles. These elements become an institution only if agents 
collectively believe in and observe them. Such beliefs can be based upon hierarchical 
control processes which, again, have to be credible. Thus, any formal rule needs an 
informal validation to become an institution. As soon as the institution represents a 
Nash-equilibrium, validation is guaranteed, since it is in the best interest of each agent 
to act accordingly. Tacit representations of an equilibrium such as custom get little 
attention in the Stanford extension. How they emerge, how they change over time, and 
how they are abandoned remains unknown.39
 Apart from a genetic transmission of basic rules like fairness, of which little is still 
known, rules have to be learned anew by each generation. This is what we call socialisation. 
It can happen by observation and experimentation, or by formal and informal tuition. 
Before you obtain a driving licence you have to pass an exam testing your knowledge of 
the traffi c rules. To switch the rules is a costly affair: the new generation will learn it as 
something normal, but the older generations will have to fi rst unlearn the old rules and 
then adopt the new rules. These costs give rise to intergenerational changes and path-
dependence. For rules that cannot be decreed, a switch is even more diffi cult: how do 
you convince a society that a corruption equilibrium is bad and should be replaced by a 
more effi cient non-corruption equilibrium? Since this only works if all act accordingly, 
the switch to the Pareto-superior situation is a collective action problem.
 Both Aoki and Greif stress the endogenous nature of the institution-as-an-equilibrium. 
As soon as the equilibrium has been established this is evident. But how does it become 
established? A game cannot begin without any rules. That is where history enters the 
scene. At any time there are institutions as default settings: ‘One can never have an 
institution-free world from which to start the analysis and completely eliminate appeals 
to exogenously given, humanly devised rule structures’.40 If they are not well-adapted to 
the technological parameters of the game, they will have to be adapted endogeneously. 
This brings us to the issue of institutional change.
 Purely endogeneous institutional change poses logical problems: why should people 
leave a given equilibrium which confi rms their expectations and which is confi rmed by 
their behaviour? ‘Endogenous instititutional change appears, then, to be a contradiction 
in terms’.41 We may take this at least as an explanation of the persistence of institutions 
which can be observed even when parameters of the game have changed. Greif describes 
marginal institutional changes (i.e. evolutionary incrementalism).42 Persistence of old 
institutions or the asymmetry between traditional and alternative institutional settings 
play an important role: ‘Organizations inherited from the past have various capacities 
that they acquired through their operation: routines, information, and other assets, such 
38 J. Tirole, The Theory of Industrial Organization (1988), at 261.
39 But see G.A. Akerlof, ‘A Theory of Social Custom, of which Unemployment May Be One Consequence’, 
94 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 4 (1980) and Schlicht (1993), above n. 4.
40 Aoki, above n. 36, at 15.
41 Greif, above n. 36, at 159.
42 Id., at 188-211.
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as legitimacy; intraorganizational personal relationships and communication codes; 
information-processing capacities; technological know-how; and human, social, and 
physical capital’.43 
 Altering just some of these institutional elements, which are mostly interlocked, 
must be an extremely diffi cult task. Even if there are institutional entrepreneurs, they 
cannot do the job alone, but have to win over a critical mass of players who believe 
that the game is played according to new rules. Such a change has a certain positive 
probability if it is marginal with respect to ingrained institutions, and if it enlarges the 
domain of the game. 
 Aoki, on the other hand, stresses the mismatch between beliefs and actual 
conditions.44 Thus, his is more a theory of institutional transformation. Once the old 
institutions cannot be taken for granted any more, there arises a cognitive disequilibrium 
between what is believed and what is experienced and, therefore, an institutional crisis. 
The causes are exogenous: technological innovation, new markets, external shocks, 
institutional changes in neighbouring domains such as political changes. However, they 
can also be endogenous in terms of cumulative internal impacts, such as a change in the 
distribution of assets or power. All this makes the implementation and reproduction of 
old rules rather dubious. However, only a large gap between aspiration and achievement 
will trigger entrepreneurial mutation or ‘synchronized searches among agents for a 
redefi nition of their respective subjective game models’.45 The Schumpeterian fl avour 
of this process is palpable. People search, learn, and emulate in order to fi nd more 
appropriate rules of the game. If they do not, or fail, which is a distinct possibility, the 
old institutions persist and the system becomes stagnant.
6 Hayek’s Approach
Turning now from the pragmatic approaches to institutional change towards the ‘organic’ 
ones, one might recall that both can be called evolutionary in the sense that they create 
and disseminate novelty. Design-oriented scholars like Demsetz, North, and Ostrom 
also consider their approaches as evolutionary, since the fi nal state of institutional 
development has not been intended ex ante. Yet each step on the way to it is an act of 
deliberate choice. What we get is a process of sequential decision making or incremental 
change. Path-dependence and incrementalism may prevent the implementation of the 
most effi cient institutional regime. However, as North has emphasised, there is nothing 
spontaneous about this process.46 This may be called the pragmatic-constructivist 
variant of evolutionary theory. 
 Hayek’s is a truly organic-evolutionary approach. He passionately opposes 
constructivism,47 which he sees as the fundamental error in socialist planning of any 
type. The reason is a lack of knowledge: ‘We have never designed our economic system. 
We were not intelligent enough for that’.48 However, he had, of course, to recognise 
that positive design is an important source of institutional change. In contrast to 
Menger, Hayek identifi es not two, but three sources of institutions and, hence, potential 
institutional change.49 There are, fi rstly, the genetically inherited instincts, the state of 
the mind. It may be seen as the result of natural evolution. However, the mind is also 
the result of the social environment which is predominantly derived from the second 
source of institutional order, spontaneous evolution. The rules that, for the most part, 
make up the social environment do not stem from deliberate choice, but are acquired by 
chance and spread by a group selection process, for reason of the fact that they enhance 
43 Id., at 193.
44 Aoki, above n. 36, at 239-244.
45 Id., at 241.
46 North (2005), above n. 17, at 51.
47 F.A. Hayek, Die Irrtümer des Konstruktivismus (1975).
48 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 3: The Political Order of a Free People (1979), at 
164.
49 Id., at 159-160.
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prosperity. These rules rest in the mind as traditions, customs, beliefs, and modes of 
thinking. Finally, there is also ‘the thin layer of rules, deliberately adopted or modifi ed 
to serve known purposes’.50 
 Hayek’s concept of institution consists of rules and order. In this context, order has 
a certain normative connotation and a special meaning.51 As a matter of fact, it would 
appear to have two meanings. Firstly, order is the set of rules that govern behaviour. 
This comes very close to Aoki’s representation of an equilibrium. From our partial 
knowledge of the order, we can derive expectations about the rest that may prove correct, 
which is clearly the function of institutions. Secondly, order is the equilibrium state of 
a system which has been shaped by, amongst other things, a set of rules. Examples 
include the division of labour, the price system, the legal order and the monetary order. 
The division of labour is obviously not an institution; the three others are, in the above-
mentioned sense, ‘constraints that human beings impose on themselves’. Prices, laws, 
and money motivate and constrain economic decision-making. All four kinds of order 
can be installed by pragmatic construction as, for instance, Soviet-type economies have 
done. However, to think that this could be effi cient is, in Hayek’s view, ‘a fatal conceit’.
 This is easily understood as far as the price system is concerned. The planned 
prices of socialist economies never refl ected the intricate interrelations of economic 
quantities and they always were behind the times. It is clear that prices must be the 
result of spontaneous evolution and still are the result of rational individual decisions. 
After all, behind each price tag there is a price setting authority which has to adapt to 
the competitive market situation in order to survive. Thus, competition is the selection 
process which distinguishes between the successful and the less successful economic 
units. It is correct, however, to assert that the price system is a spontaneous order and 
has no purpose as a maker (since there is no maker) and intentionality within the order 
is lacking.
 In the case of the legal and monetary orders, it is somewhat more diffi cult to show 
them to be the result of spontaneous evolution. Quite understandably, Hayek has a 
predilection for the common law system and a system of free banking which both show 
less constructivist positivism and more competitive elements. The rules that ultimately 
make up these systems may be the outcome of pragmatic legislation. The legal order 
behind the system is a spontaneous one. Nobody has designed it. Hayek holds that 
people come across new institutions by chance.52 The idea is taken from the Scottish 
enlightenment philosopher Adam Ferguson that ‘nations stumble upon establishments, 
which are indeed the result of human action but not the execution of any human 
design’.53 Adam Smith’s invisible hand metaphor refl ects the same idea. What are 
known as chance and spontaneity are, in fact, the unintended consequences of mostly 
rational action. However, this is necessarily so, since laws may as well be formalisations 
of engrained customs whose rational origins are questionable: ‘Although man never 
existed without laws that he obeyed, he did, of course, exist for hundreds of thousands 
of years without laws he ‘knew’ in the sense that he was able to articulate them’.54 
 Hayek’s approach was not only derived from Scottish enlightenment. He also drew 
inspiration from Armen Alchian’s brief, but brilliant, article of 1950.55 Alchian makes it 
clear that, whatever the driving forces of individual entrepreneurs may be, the system 
selects those who show positive (not maximal) profi ts ex post. They survive. He does 
not deny that purposive, foresighted behaviour exists, although, in reality, there is not 
suffi cient foresight to indicate profi table action ex ante. ‘The essential point is that 
individual motivation and foresight, whilst suffi cient, are not necessary’.56 Innovation 
may be due to intentional experimentation using new combinations, as well as to random 
factors of which the actors may not even be aware. Intentionality is unnecessary for 
50 Id., at 160.
51 F.A. Hayek, Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 1: Rules and Order (1973).
52 F.A. Hayek, ‘Arten der Ordnung’, in F.A. Hayek, Freiburger Studien (1969), at 42 (32-46).
53 Quoted in Hayek (1973), above n. 51, at 150.
54 Id., at 43. 
55 A. Alchian, ‘Uncertainty, Evolution and Economic Theory’, in A. Alchian, Economic Forces at Work 
(1977).
56 Id., at 27.
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economic progress, and lacking knowledge makes it suspect. The system adopts success 
by survival and is unconcerned as to the motives or random factors behind success. 
Survivors can, at best, try to adapt intentionally to the factors they consider responsible 
for such success. However, past success is no guarantee of future success, and the 
factors behind success cannot easily be formulated as simple rules. Imitation is a crude 
method of encapsulating such factors. In this respect, Alchian is even more radical than 
Hayek, for whom imitation is a viable strategy to higher welfare. The difference lies in 
the object of analysis. Alchian is analysing fi rm behaviour for which the environment 
is changing rapidly, while Hayek is analysing social behaviour for which a successful 
solution will have longer lasting effects. Alchian’s approach is meant as a Darwinian 
analogy, the economic system being ‘an evolutionary, adopting, competitive system 
employing a criterion of survival’.57 
 As with the biological theory of evolution, chance produces new combinations which 
are then selected by competition. Groups with successful institutions or well-structured 
organisations crowd out less successful ones, or the latter will imitate the solutions 
of the former. This, of course, is an act of pragmatic constructivism. It is the order 
that emerges spontaneously, not necessarily the rules. Somewhat grudgingly, Hayek 
acknowledges the fact that positive rule-making may be aiming at a concrete order and 
does not immediately fall under the verdict of constructivism: ‘Although undoubtedly 
an order originally formed itself spontaneously because the individuals followed rules 
which had not been deliberately made but had arisen spontaneously, people gradually 
learned to improve those rules; and it is at least conceivable that the formation of the 
spontaneous order relies entirely on rules that were deliberately made’.58 We recall the 
tacit representations of equilibria by Greif and Aoki.
 Whilst the pragmatic-constructivist theories of institutional change must treat 
institutions and beliefs separately, Hayek’s evolutionary approach allows for the 
integration of the two: ‘The mind does not so much make rules as consists of rules of 
action … which have come to govern the actions of the individuals because actions in 
accordance with them have proved more successful than those of competing individuals 
or groups’.59 The individual mind is the product of its social environment and, at the 
same time, exerts a marginal infl uence upon it. The mind and the social order, or culture 
as Hayek also calls it, co-evolve in a unifi ed historical process and not successively 
with the mind determining culture.60 In the end, people share beliefs and expectations, 
and produce an equilibrium ‘order’. However, the outcome is not necessarily good 
governance. The character of the emerging order is, in general, indeterminate. A state 
in which corruption is the rule will produce an order of low productivity and bad 
governance. Since corruption pays, people stick to it. On the whole, Hayek’s approach 
is as optimistic as the Marx-Schumpeter theory: less effi cient institutions will be 
superseded by more effi cient ones if they are available. 
 Although Hayek does not endorse it, Max Weber’s protestant ethic can serve as a nice 
example of spontaneous evolution à la Hayek. It is well known that Weber conjectured 
reformation having changed the belief system of those who adhered to the Lutheran 
or Calvinist creed. Neither Luther nor Calvin intended to promote capitalism. But 
strengthened individual responsibility, innerworldliness, and ascetic sobriety (as were 
required by the new creed) were thought to have set in motion a process of development, 
which resulted in the spirit of capitalism. Recent research by Becker and Woessmann61 
has given a new twist to the Weber hypothesis. They are able to show that it was not 
so much a new ideology, but an unprecedented push in education that was the decisive 
force in the aforementioned circumstances. Protestants were supposed to read the Bible 
personally, which meant they had to learn how to read. That constituted the deliberate 
intention of princes and city magistrates alike to develop the education system. The 
unintended consequence was a discrete rise in human capital and new possibilities for 
57 Id., at 31.
58 Hayek (1973), above n. 51, at 45.
59 Id. at 18.
60 Hayek (1979), above n. 48, at 156.
61 S.O. Becker and L. Woessmann,‘Was Weber Wrong? A Human Capital Theory of Protestant Economic 
History’, 124 Quarterly Journal of Economics 2 (2009).
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the acquisition and spread of knowledge. A new order emerged spontaneously. The 
driving forces of the Marx-Schumpeter theory are not invalidated. However, clearly 
no entrepreneur could have planned this effect in advance. According to Hayek, there 
are no entrepreneurs driving the process of institutional change. However, once it is 
known that education is a key to economic welfare, appropriate policy measures can be 
conceived. If this does not happen, one has to look for powerful forces that block such 
measures.
7 Where Are We Now?
The question of institutional change can be split into two distinct problems and two 
distinct societal groups: innovation or change at the institutional frontier (the countries 
on the left side of Table 1), and imitation of or catching up to the institutional frontier (the 
countries on the right side of Table 1). The theories mentioned above deal primarily with 
the former. Hayek, in particular, is exclusively interested in institutional innovation, but 
also scholars in the optimistic Marx-Schumpeter tradition perceive this as the challenging 
puzzle. North, among others, is aware of the fact that, more often than not, the second 
group of countries fails to catch up; this constitutes an even more challenging puzzle. 
As the table clearly shows, good governance pays. It is the institution-as-an-equilibrium 
approach of Aoki and Greif which offers some explanation as to why equilibria are 
tenacious, as well as why a great deal of effort is required in order to bring about change 
within them. 
 It is certainly no understatement to conclude that institutional change remains a 
poorly understood phenomenon. What we have are institutions as sets of rules, beliefs, 
and habits that motivate and constrain individual behaviour. Actual behaviour and 
its outcomes reconfi rm such institutions. Rules, beliefs, and habits do not operate 
separately. Rules become institutions only when people believe in them. This can be 
secured by control and enforcing devices that thus become part of the rules. But, again, 
such devices must be credible which remains a question of belief. Credibility can be 
procured by coercion, as the term enforcing suggests. But greater stability of institutions 
results from self-enforcing arrangements. Both methods may coexist. Through a well-
developed civil law, a contract can be enforced by litigation. However, this happens 
only in exceptional cases, since the process is costly. Usually, contracts are fulfi lled. The 
rules of the game are institutionalised and fi rmly observed, even by those who do not 
understand the proper legal procedure.
 Equilibrium is attacked from the outside by changes in the knowledge and the 
environment that create externalities. The negative effects of such externalities can 
be mitigated by internalisation (i.e. institutional change). It is also attacked from the 
inside by changes in accumulated assets and power and, perhaps, spontaneous changes 
of players’ perceptions. Internal developments in the market may, for instance, lead to 
the emergence of a monopoly position that gradually changes the rules of the game. 
Alternatively, some players ‘stumble’ upon new insights into how to organise their 
activities, and their resulting success induces others to adopt the innovation. 
 For reason of the asymmetry between incumbent and alternative institutions, the 
incumbent show a remarkable persistence. This raises the diffi cult question as to the 
time needed for institutional change. It does take time, and it is often said that very long 
periods are involved. It is assumed that people will trust each other and their institutions 
only after long periods of cooperative communication and experience, and that the 
power of those who frame institutions is reproduced by those very institutions. Several 
studies look into the origins and effects of trust and social capital, the aggregate of 
social institutions. The seminal work by Putnam shows how similar formal institutions 
within one country (Italy) function differently and have different outcomes in different 
regions.62 For instance, the judicial system, which has been uniform for 150 years, works 
62 R.D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work. Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993).
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differently in Northern and Southern Italy.63 An explanation is provided by the beliefs 
and other informal institutions of civil society which have emerged over centuries in 
the respective regions. Putnam’s conjecture concerns the long-term effect of having 
been an independent city-state some time in the Middle Ages. It has been confi rmed 
by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales who show that even in Central and Northern Italy 
formerly independent cities have a higher social capital than formerly dependent ones.64 
Interestingly, the period of active experience of civilian cooperation required in order to 
produce such a benefi cial effect may be rather short (i.e. 2 to 3 generations).This softens 
one of Putnam’s pessimistic conclusions, namely that in the short-term, there is little 
that can be done about that state of affairs, since culture, by its very nature, is considered 
to be a slow moving phenomenon.
 The infl uence of elites upon the persistence of institutions is less long-term compared 
to culture. But as long as ruling elites stay in power, they will be able to frame important 
institutions, and the belief of others that they will stay in power makes these institutions 
work. So institutional change is closely linked to the life cycle or exchange of elites.65 
A striking exemplifi cation was the post-socialist transformation. It demonstrated that 
elites and their ideology, as long as they are powerful, can perpetuate less effi cient 
institutions for quite a long period. Coercion has played an important role in this context. 
Necessary modifi cations are constrained, and prevailing beliefs hold that nothing can be 
done about it. It is an equilibrium, albeit not a very stable one. For once the barriers to 
change are removed, once ideology has lost credibility and elites have lost power, the 
process of change can become instantaneous and vehement. Liberalisation during the 
course of post-socialist transformation constituted the removal of legal and ideological 
impediments for alternative institutional solutions, among which the reform elites were 
then able to make a choice. Of course, for the reform elites to gain legitimacy and for 
the new institutions to gain credibility will take more time than the system switch itself.
8 Post-socialist transformation and evolutionary change
Transformations, for which there are many more examples, are obviously not cases 
of evolutionary institutional change. However, the relative success of the operation 
depends on long-term factors. Post-socialist transition countries share the legacy 
of a bloc culture, giving priority to communal values over individualism, safety and 
infl exibility over innovation and tolerance, dependence upon the state over self-reliance, 
but at the same time, creating mistrust towards public institutions and causing retreat 
into the private sphere.66 In order to get rid of this legacy, a new generation, socialised 
in a different environment, is needed. On the other hand, post-socialist transformation 
has been characterised by a marked divergence of the emerging political and economic 
systems that is illustrated by differences in governance quality (see Table 2). 
 Bruszt et al. show that pre-transition existence and activity of civil society (i.e. a 
network of politically active individuals independent from the state) determine the 
intensity and direction of change: ‘Countries with a vibrant pre-transition civil society 
have embarked on a path towards sound political institutions, economic reforms 
and democratization. Countries that had little in a way of civil society and/or whose 
governments repressed it have, in turn, introduced more authoritarian regimes or, at 
best, dragged their feet on economic and political liberalisation’.67 
 As in Putnam’s case, the crucial question concerns what makes civil society active in 
some countries and sluggish in others. The respective countries are not spread randomly 
63 G. Tabellini, ‘Culture and Institutions: Economic Development in the Regions of Europe’, 8 Journal of 
the European Economic Association 4 (2010).
64 L. Guiso, P. Sapienza and L. Zingales, ‘Long Term Persistence’, EUI Working Paper, ECO 2008/30 
(2008).
65 J. A. Robinson, Elites and Institutional Persistence, UNU-Wider Working Paper No. 2010/85 (2010).
66 P. Sztompka, ‘Looking Back: The Year 1989 as a Cultural and Civilizational Break’, 29 Communist and 
Post-Communist Studies 2 (1996).
67 L. Bruszt et al., ‘Civil Society, Institutional Change and the Politics of Reform. The Great Transition’, 
UNU-Wider Working Paper No. 2010/38 (2010), at 21.
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over the whole post-socialist area. The pre-transition existence of civil society is strongly 
correlated with pre-communist experience with democracy and market economy and, at 
the same time, with geographical proximity to better governed societies (i.e. the West). 
Again, both factors have rather long induction periods.
Table 2: Average Governance Quality in Post-socialist Countries
Country 1996 2009 Change Country 1996 2009 Change
Albania – 0.19 – 0.13 + 0.06 Bulgaria – 0.32 0.27 + 0.59
Armenia – 0.51 – 0.22 + 0.29 Czech Rep. 0.86 0.94 + 0.08
Azerbaijan – 0.92 – 0.73 + 0.19 Estonia 0.64 1.08 + 0.44
Croatia – 0.31  0.44 + 0.75 Hungary 0.81 0.79 – 0.02
Georgia – 0.83 – 0.13 + 0.70 Latvia 0.14 0.67 + 0.53
Macedonia – 0.26 – 0.01 + 0.25 Lithuania 0.37 0.70 + 0.33
Moldava – 0.12 – 0.45 – 0.23 Poland 0.78 0.78 0.00
Serbia – 1.04 – 0.17 + 0.87 Romania – 0.12 0.22 + 0.34
Russia – 0.63 – 0.72 – 0.09 Slovakia 0.47 0.79 + 0.32
Ukraine – 0.55 – 0.55  0.00 Slovenia 1.06 1.01 – 0.05
Kazakhstan – 0.80 – 0.41 + 0.39
Kyrgyzstan – 0.30 – 0.89 – 0.59
Tajikistan – 1.87 – 1.44 + 0.43 Germany 1.54 1.42 – 0.12
Turkmenistan – 1.35 – 1.44 – 0.09 Netherlands 1.64 1.62 – 0.02
Uzbekistan – 1.07 – 1.27 – 0.20 Sweden 1.61 1.75 + 0.14
 Source: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/wgidataset.xls; own calculations.
Governance quality is measured by the World Bank team in units following a normal 
distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one. This implies that almost 
all scores lie between –2.5 and +2.5. The confi dence interval of the individual mean 
values denotes that minor differences between countries and minor changes over time 
are not signifi cant. 1996 is the earliest year for which data are available. Nevertheless, 
the table is quite informative. Each country has its own story and history which we 
cannot elaborate upon here. EU-member states (the right side of the table) have, from 
the outset, a signifi cantly better governance quality than the non-EU-member states 
(the left side of the table). Amongst the former, the lowest ranking countries (Bulgaria, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia) have improved markedly over the last 15 
years or so, whilst historically established ‘westernised’ states, such as Poland, Hungary, 
and the Czech Republic, did not change their comparatively high scores in the short-
run. Amongst the latter, those countries that are candidates or prospective candidates of 
EU or NATO (Croatia, Georgia, Macedonia, Serbia) have improved their governance 
quality as well. 
 It seems patently clear that EU and/or NATO membership, or even just the prospect 
of joining such organisations, has a signifi cant impact upon the governance quality of 
post-socialist transition countries.68 Membership is considered a transformation anchor. 
Both organisations require certain standards of democracy, rule of law, internal confl ict 
management, respect of human and minority rights, control of corruption, and both 
organisations support candidate countries personally and materially in acquiring such 
standards, which are clearly shaped by Western social culture. Table 2, however, also 
reveals that the two sets of countries differ already with regard to their initial conditions. 
In order to become an EU candidate, a country has to be in a certain geographical 
68 A. Belke et al., Prospective NATO or EU Membership and Institutional Change in Transition Countries, 
DIW Diskussionspapier Nr. 915 (2009).
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location bordering EU territory which, at the same time, implies historical contacts with 
Western political and social culture. It is therefore not an easy task to separate the impact 
of short-term factors such as (prospective) membership of Western organisations from 
long-term factors such as a common physical and historical ground upon institutional 
quality and change.
 Such history and spatial proximity will infl uence the transmission of values, beliefs, 
traditions, and customs, and thus facilitate the transmission of rules and regulations which 
may be taken for granted. This has also been confi rmed empirically.69 The transmission 
of rules and regulations constitutes either an act of deliberate institutional change or of 
hegemonial imposition. Both can happen over very long distances. Colonial rule has 
spread European legal practices across the oceans. Such practices were not relinquished 
when these territories gained autonomy. Other societies have voluntarily adopted or 
imitated what they considered to be best practices. Thus, we fi nd traces of German 
civil law in Japan and traces of the Napoleonic code in South America. Joining the EU 
constitutes a special case, requiring the adoption of the so-called acquis communautaire. 
However, such are results of an autonomous decision taken by the recipient society.
 European based rules and regulations constitute no guarantee for good governance. 
If l’esprit des lois, the values, beliefs, traditions, and customs that bring the formal 
institutions to life are lacking, sound formal regulations are to no avail. Moreover, this 
esprit des lois cannot be transferred by clever reform elites. Societies with the best 
chance of encompassing this notion are those which have lived with it for a period of 
time, or are in close contact with well-governed and welfaring neighbours. Becker et 
al. have pointed to what they call the Habsburg effect.70 Many East-European countries 
were, at least temporarily, under Habsburg rule, some of the modern states, like Poland 
and the Ukraine, for only part of their present territory. Compared to other empires in 
the area, Habsburg rule was distinguished as having a fairly rational administration. 
The Habsburg empire was dissolved around a century ago. However, people who live 
on former Habsburg territory today still demonstrate higher trust in courts and police, 
and are less inclined to pay bribes: ‘The institutional heritage infl uences not only 
preferences and unilateral decisions but also bilateral bargaining situations in citizen-
state interactions’.71
 Experience of good government gives rise to generalised trust, which is necessary 
in overcoming the collective action problem associated with the change from a bad to 
a good equilibrium. This conundrum is addressed by Bo Rothstein, who extensively 
describes how Swedish industrial relations switched in the 1930s from an antagonistic 
to a cooperative organisation.72 In line with Rothstein’s hypothesis, the switch 
presupposed mutual trust, which existed because of longer term experience of impartial 
state offi cials. The Habsburg effect seems to corroborate this hypothesis. However, we 
now enter into an infi nite regress because we would like to know why Swedish state 
offi cials were impartial in the fi rst place. In his more recent book, Rothstein answers 
the question by pointing to the Swedish modernisation process in the middle of the 
19th century.73 In other words, a concrete institutional change can be explained only in 
an evolutionary way, through a long historical process that, however, was not unique. 
Similar political developments unfolded all over Europe. Modern economic growth and 
institutional modernisation started some 250 years ago. They can be understood only in 
conjunction with one another.
 But what of those countries that did not fall under Habsburg rule and were not included 
in the European wave of modernisation; are they doomed to bad governance and poverty? 
This is by no means the case, since path-dependence, history, and geography, important 
as they may be, are not deterministic factors of development. China, which until the 
69 E.g. most recently by P. Grosjean, ‘The Weight of History on European Cultural Integration: A Gravity 
Approach’, 101 American Economic Review 3 (2011).
70 S.O. Becker, K. Boeckh, C. Hainz and L.Woessmann, The Empire is Dead, Long Live the Empire! 
Long-Run Persistence of Trust and Corruption in the Bureaucracy, CESIFO Working Paper No. 3392 
(2011).
71 Id., at 25. 
72 Rothstein (2005), above n. 10.
73 Rothstein (2011), above n. 9, at 115-116.
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late 1970s fi tted perfectly into the general template of a backward society, suddenly 
switched to a path of good (economic) governance and economic growth. What had 
changed, however, were not the values, beliefs, and traditions of the entrepreneurial 
strata, but only the formal constraints and policies under which they were operating 
(i.e. the beliefs of the ruling elite and, perhaps, the ruling elite itself). Other backward 
and badly governed states could also unleash fettered forces of development through 
liberalisation and the removal of infl exible or predatory elites. Only then can long-term 
cultural factors be ascertained in an unbiased manner. 
9 Conclusions
Douglass North concludes his exploration into institutional change with the following 
statements:
[We are getting it right (good governance) when] we perceive correctly 
changes in the human environment, incorporate those perceptions in our 
belief system, and alter the institutions accordingly.
[We are getting it wrong (bad governance)] when the accumulated 
experiences and beliefs derived from the past do not provide a correct guide 
for future decision making. There are two reasons. … The fi rst of these 
factors stems from our not correctly comprehending what is happening 
to us; the second, from an inability to make the necessary institutional 
adjustments.74
These are almost tautologies boiling down to the statement: good governance is the 
result of good institutions and bad governance of bad institutions. We either have a 
good or a bad perception of the environment, or we are able or not able to devise the 
institutions accordingly. Given the huge difference in governance quality and welfare 
that is documented in Table 1, and assuming that human beings are suffi ciently rational 
individuals, it is hard to believe that people do not notice what the circumstances around 
them are. Thus, the second factor exercises greater infl uence: people are unable to make 
the necessary institutional adjustments. 
 This is unsatisfactory for any society at the lower end of the welfare scale. 
Furthermore, North’s excuse that ‘By now it should be clear that no dynamic theory 
of change is advanced in this study and I hope that it is equally clear that no such 
theory that could be useful is likely to evolve’75 provides little consolation. North’s 
nihilism seems to be due to the crucial role of beliefs in his treatment of institutional 
change. They are fi xed for the span of time that is politically relevant. Cultural change 
is out of reach for politics. Whilst this is true, there is a huge gap, documented in Table 
1, between governance quality and welfare which cannot be ascribed exclusively to 
corresponding differences in culture. Making the necessary institutional adjustments 
is all that a pragmatic theory of institutional change entails. However, the ambiguous 
co-evolution of institutions and development allows for doubts about institutional 
change as a panacea against poverty.76 But, bad governance can also be the result of bad 
governors. Changing the power distribution in society does lie within the time horizon 
of political actors. 
 Figure 1 above should be kept in mind. The aim of any society must be to reach 
the next highest equilibrium on its way to achieving good governance. Although each 
lower equilibrium is locked-in by beliefs, inertia, and prisoners’ dilemma situations, 
there still are a number of things which can be done. The higher equilibrium is perhaps 
practiced in an adjacent country. Culturally, such a country may not be so different 
to one’s own country; people may know and understand the traditions and beliefs of 
their neighbours, and could be able to learn from them. Indeed, there is the asymmetry 
between established and new beliefs. But new beliefs linked to a higher equilibrium are 
74 North (2005), above n. 17, at 116-117.
75 Id., at 125-126.
76 Paldam and Gundlach, above n. 11.
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clearly advantageous: ‘If it is advantageous to corner the custom in borderline cases, 
this will be done and the custom will erode’.77 An institutional system is an equilibrium. 
It reproduces itself because people act accordingly and the interests of the system 
managers are catered for. But it can be a Pareto-inferior equilibrium. There will be 
entrepreneurs who will try to test new institutions. Pareto-superiority enables them to 
carry the costs of change and to compensate eventual losers. As a rule, this will be a 
gradual process. 
 Institutions change continuously in reaction to environmental changes. We may not 
be aware of this fact because most changes are slow and the precise content of some 
institutions, especially the belief systems, belongs to the realm of tacit knowledge. 
The economic argument based on utility is always an optimistic argument. It predicts 
incremental change (i.e. evolutionary progress and convergence). The cultural argument 
based on values and beliefs is rather pessimistic. Being hesitant about speaking of 
progress, it stresses differences and shuns prediction. Changes are considered slow, 
and by their very nature, evolutionary. The political argument based on power sits in 
between these extremes. If power is not properly checked and contested, it can explain 
divergence. If power is overthrown, changes may become revolutionary.
77 Schlicht, above n. 4, at 185.

